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Blog Admin
Today, David Cameron gave his long-awaited speech on the future of the
UK’s relationship with the EU. We asked EUROPP’s expert contributors for
their immediate reactions and their thoughts on the speech’s implications for
the UK and Europe.
Cameron is deeply deluded if  he thinks that a referendum
will sett le the European debate for all t ime – Andrew Duf f
MEP, European Federalists
If  negotiations are seen to fail there will likely be options made available to the UK that
stop short of Brexit  – Simon Glendinning, LSE European Institute 
As a marriage partner scorned once too many by threats of infidelity, the EU is giving
Britain a much colder shoulder than it  expected -  Robert Hancké, LSE European Institute
A public debate about Europe, but when?  – Damian Chalmers, LSE European Institute and
Department of Law
The most important question is how the other polit ical parties in the UK will respond -
Simon Usherwood, University of Surrey
There is lit t le point in saying ‘no’ to the EU if  we can’t  put forward a legit imate
alternative -  Stuart A Brown, LSE Public Policy Group
Cameron’s speech might be a game changer for the Scottish independence campaign -
Arno van der Zwet, University of Strathclyde
Making the reasons and areas for re-negotiation more explicit  should make the average
Brit ish cit izen very wary and uncomfortable about this whole proposit ion -  Bart Cammaerts,
LSE Media and Communications
Cameron is deeply deluded if  he thinks that a referendum will sett le the European debate for all
t ime 
Andrew Duff MEP – European Federalists
That there will be a ref erendum in Britain is hardly a surprise. Since 2011, EU ref erendums
have been entrenched in Britain’s f ragile constitution. Nor is the timetable new. The
constitutional Convention cannot start until spring 2015. The Convention will be f ollowed
by an intergovernmental conf erence. Then national ratif ication procedures will start
across the EU. Several countries will have a ref erendum. All have to agree. What matters
is the nature of  the package deal to be reached in those negotiations. The Brit ish
problem will only f orm relatively minor part of  that negotiation.
The primary purpose of  the Convention will be to install a f ederal economic government of  a f iscal union.
It is that f ederal treaty on which the UK people will be asked to vote not the current state of  play.
The EU which comes out of  the present crisis will be very much more integrated than it is now. This gives
each polit ical party in Britain the chance to come out in f avour of  a strong united democratic Europe
providing stability and prosperity at home and leadership f or peace and justice in world af f airs.
Mr Cameron displays alarming levels of  ignorance and prejudice about the European Union. But he will
now learn how the EU really works. In particular, if  he wants to recast existing EU laws he needs to win
the support of  MEPs. So f ar his att itude to the European Parliament has been marked more by contempt
than by respect. Lastly, the prime minister is also deeply deluded if  he thinks that a ref erendum will settle
the European debate f or all t ime. It won’t.
If  negotiations are seen to fail there will likely be options made available to the UK that stop
short of Brexit
Simon Glendinning – Reader in European Philosophy in the European Institute
There are two issues to consider in the wake of  Cameron’s Europe speech. First, the
“vision” of  the EU that Cameron set out to def end. This was a genuinely pro-EU
contribution, alive both to the UK’s historical connections with Europe and alive as well to
the f act that the UK impact on the f uture shape of  the EU is likely to be limited in view of
developments in the Eurozone. I think that the vision of  the EU mapped out by Cameron
f airly represents a mainstream view in the UK: the EU’s ambition should be to avoid the
twin threats of  both bureaucratic centralisation and petty nationalism in Europe.
The second issue concerns the “polit ics” of  Cameron’s pro-EU strategy, and here the jury is still out.
There are real concerns that if  Brussels simply says no to what it may call “cherry picking”, Cameron’s
strategy – which seems to place a huge bet on achieving some sort of  credible or at least arguable
“repatriation of  powers” – will leave him no option but the Brexit door. In the end, however, the f irst issue
is the more signif icant. Events and developments in the Eurozone have made a reassessment of  the
UK’s place in the EU all but unavoidable, and if  negotiations are seen to f ail there will likely be options
made available to the UK that stop short of  Brexit.
As a marriage partner scorned once too many by threats of infidelity, the EU is giving Britain a
much colder shoulder than it  expected
Robert Hancké  – LSE European Institute
The cat is out of  the bag. David Cameron’s call f or an in or out ref erendum prior to
renegotiating (or, at least, trying to renegotiate) the terms of  Brit ish EU membership is a
classic ploy in international diplomacy. Polit ical scientists immediately recognized this
tactic as a ‘two- level game’. The Brit ish prime minister ef f ectively said to his European
neighbours ‘Give me what I want, else I cannot def end the posit ion at home of  staying in
the EU’, and used the ref erendum as a hard device to f orce their hand. But Cameron
seems to have overlooked one crucial part of  the two- level game: the tactic works best, possibly even
only, if  the other side is basically very happy with the arrangement. And until very recently, there was no
doubt that the rest of  the EU pref erred Britain in – some f or reasons of  ideological closeness around a
wide but shallow union, others simply because an EU without the UK makes no sense.
Thus, each time Britain asked f or a slightly dif f erent treatment, vowing it was sorry to do so but was lef t
no choice because of  the polit ical and media situation in London, the other EU partners complied. But
now, as a marriage partner scorned once too many by threats of  inf idelity, the EU is giving Britain a much
colder shoulder than it expected. And with that, the two- level game tactic unravels: the ref erendum at
home, which was supposed to be France and Germany’s problem, has suddenly become a problem f or
David Cameron the moment Hollande, Merkel and leaders of  a host of  other countries told him that an
EU a la carte was out of  the question. Sometimes you wish that polit icians had at the very least a
rudimentary training in polit ical science. This is one of  those times.
A public debate about Europe, but when?
Damian Chalmers - LSE European Institute and Department of Law
The Prime Minister ’s invitation f or a national debate about the United Kingdom’s
relationship with the European Union is a valuable and timely one. All relationships, even
polit ical ones, need revisit ing if  they are to be sustained. It is over f orty years since this
one was revisited. Both parties have changed considerably in that t ime. However, it is not
clear when the debate is to take place. Or even if  it  will take place at all….
The bottom line is that, if  all else, f ails, the Conservative manif esto will ask f or a mandate to renegotiate
a new settlement with the other Member States. An ‘in/out’ ref erendum will be held on UK membership of
the Union with the government recommendation depending on the outcome of  the negotiations. In the
Prime Minister ’s speech, this is, however, only a back-up strategy. His pref erence is f or his suggested
ref orms to be adopted by the Union as a whole. He, theref ore, calls f or general treaty revision to take
place, presumably preceded by an IGC. It is only if  this f ails that he will seek a special settlement f or the
United Kingdom.
However, the dates being mooted f or such an IGC are 2015 at the earliest. With negotiations and then
possible ref erenda in the dif f erent Member States, it could be 2017 until we know the answer to whether
a ‘Brit ish settlement’ is needed. Furthermore, it is not clear if  this new Treaty would attract a ref erendum.
For the Brit ish, at least, it would not be extending EU competencies, EU institutional powers or QMV so
would seem to f all under the exception in section 4(4) European Union 2011. Even if  this were not the
case, what would the ref erendum be about? The new Treaty: in which case you could always vote ‘no’ (as
the Irish, Danes, Dutch and French have done) f or a better one. Or is it about the end of  EU
membership?
The second challenge is the Balance of Competences Review. Looking at the costs and benef it of
membership across all EU policies, this is not due to f inish until the end of  2014. It makes litt le sense to
f ormulate a view until the end of  this exercise with the government having invested so much time and
polit ical capital in it.
Even within this t imetable, it is optimistic to think detailed overall assessment will be possible to f eed into
dif f erent manif estos in a way that allows considered public debate of  the review and debate within the
polit ical parties.  This scenario may f urthermore be optimistic with ambush opportunit ies f or the Lib Dems
to delay the Review, and thereby claim the Conservatives do not have an evidence-based policy.
There is implicit acknowledgment of  this in the speech. Negotiations are only to take place af ter the next
election and presumably the Brit ish government would theref ore not have to take a view and f ormulate a
negotiating posit ion until then. However, this raises, in turn, real questions about the Conservative
manif esto. Is it going to be a demand to repatriate some competencies but with the proviso that ‘we
don’t know which ones yet’? This generality will be hard to sustain both f rom internal party tensions and
the scrutiny of  the press and other polit ical parties. Most likely it will be ad hoc cherry-picking of  the
document on the f ly to ward of f  UKIP voters in the run- in to 2015. This will in turn make any negotiation
of  any Brit ish settlement with the other Member States that bit harder as these react to any perceived
polit ical opportunism.
The most important question is how the other polit ical parties in the UK will respond
Simon Usherwood - University of Surrey 
For a speech with so much hype and trailing, this largely f ailed to meet even the very
limited thresholds set out by both pro- and anti-EU groups. In the end, Cameron’s
instincts as a polit ician – to hedge, to work with what is possible – prevailed. For this, we
must be thankf ul that Brit ish EU policy hasn’t been irrevocably set on a path to exit.
Nonetheless, to pretend that this is anything more than a glorif ied handling statement is
wishf ul thinking. Tory backbenchers – the key drivers of  policy in this Parliament – have
repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to settle f or anything less than withdrawal. Since the speech
of f ers nothing more than an intention to renegotiate (itself  highly doubtf ul), f or many MPs there will be a
desire to see more, and in short order.
However, the main question will be the response of  other polit ical parties. If  Labour – currently most likely
to f orm the next government – f eels compelled to respond with a matching of f er, then this is a
meaningf ul advance. One might assume that this is only going to happen if  the heat comes of f  Cameron
and he sees a big boost in the polls (questionable, given the low salience of  the EU). Until then, the
working assumption will be that the Tories will be more inclined to return to 1990s-style in- f ighting, with
all the consequences that had f or the party.
There is lit t le point in saying ‘no’ to the EU if  we can’t  put forward a legit imate alternative
Stuart A Brown – LSE Public Policy Group
If  anything other than an in/out ref erendum had been of f ered then the reaction f rom
Eurosceptics would have been severe. However there is lit t le point in saying ‘no’ to the
EU if  we can’t put f orward a legit imate alternative. Voting to leave the EU would raise a
number of  dif f erent questions f or which there are no easy answers. Exit ing the single
market is simply not an option, so the issue would then turn to how we secure our
continued participation. Following the Norwegian model of  implementing vast swathes of
EU legislation, without either UK representatives in the Council or the European Parliament being part of
discussions, is neither democratic nor in the country’s wider economic interest.
While a vote to leave the EU would be portrayed as a victory f or direct democracy and grassroots
campaigning, the reality could hardly be more dif f erent. It would generate complex negotiations over the
UK’s participation in the single market which would be driven almost entirely by elite representatives. The
only way in which the ref erendum could achieve its desired aim of  settling the European question is if  the
two options presented to the electorate were comprehensive and credible. However Cameron’s strategy
essentially involves putting his “renegotiated settlement” up against a concept which is so vague as to
be meaningless. Until we def ine exactly what leaving the EU entails, it ’s impossible f or a ref erendum to
give any clear indication of  what the Brit ish public actually want f rom their relationship with Europe.
Cameron’s speech might be a game changer for the Scottish independence campaign
Arno van der Zwet  - University of Strathclyde
The speech has the potential to change the relationship between London and Brussels,
but does it also have an impact on relations between London and Edinburgh?  Of  course,
a speech of  this magnitude brings many opportunit ies f or polit ical quipping, but to what
extent will the ‘No Camp’  and ‘Yes Camp’ in the Scottish independence campaign be
af f ected by the speech?
For those campaigning f or a ‘no’ vote in the Scottish independence ref erendum, Cameron’s speech
brings some prof ound dif f icult ies. First, the No Camp, including Cameron, has long argued that the SNP
should have called a quick ref erendum when it won an unexpected outright majority in the Scottish
Parliament in 2011. This would have avoided unnecessary polit ical and economic uncertainty. The f ive
year run up period f or a European in/out ref erendum will lead to similar accusations and theref ore
inconsistencies on the part of  the No Camp. Second, one key argument of  the No Camp has been that
Scottish independence equates with a f orm of  narrow nationalism and isolationism (its slogan is ‘Better
Together ’). This will be dif f icult to maintain when the Brit ish posit ion in Europe appears so antagonistic.
Third, The Conservatives are a marginal f orce in Scottish Polit ics and it really is the Labour Party that
leads the No Camp. In many ways they have been saddled with a problem that is not of  their own making.
Cameron’s posit ion will emphasise the disunity within the camp; not so much on the preservation of
Brit ish Union but on what the posit ion of  that Union in the world will be.
The Scottish National Party (SNP) is the main f ace of  the Yes Camp. It adopted its ‘Independence in
Europe’ strategy in the early 1990s, but the sound-bite has been less popular in recent years. Part of  this
has to do with the natural ageing process of  slogans and mantras, but there are other f actors that have
made talking about Europe dif f icult. First, despite some signs that the rescue operation of  the eurozone
may have been successf ul, the eurocrisis lies f resh in the electorate’s memory. Talk of  being in the EU is
tainted and the argument that the EU can provide security and continuity f or an independent Scotland
has perhaps become less convincing. Second, the Scottish electorate is no more pro-Europe (or equally
Eurosceptic) than their neighbours south of  the border: in the 1975 ref erendum, 10 per cent f ewer Scots
voted f or membership than did so in England. As a campaigning issue the EU can hardly be seen as a
vote winner. Third, once we scratch the surf ace of  the SNP’s ‘Independence in Europe’ headline we see
that many in the party have prof ound concerns about themes such as the Common Fisheries Policy, the
euro, the democratic def icit, and closer f iscal integration, which also makes the argument less
convincing. These issues point towards a discontent that requires renegotiation. An unequivocally
Europhile stance is neither convincing nor electorally rewarding.
The EU ref erendum takes place af ter the Scottish independence ref erendum; had it been the other way
around the ef f ects could have been prof ound. In the short term Cameron’s speech will have an impact on
the independence campaign and create dif f icult ies f or the No Camp, who will have to re-examine their
arguments and strategy. However, structural dif f icult ies of  the Yes Camp’s posit ion are not changed by
Cameron’s speech. It has changed nothing in relation to the uncertainties the eurocrisis brings or the
existing Euroscepticism in Scotland. On the other hand, the route taken by Cameron has rightly been
described as a gamble and the process will be dif f icult to control polit ically.
Making the reasons and areas for re-negotiation more explicit  should make the average Brit ish
cit izen very wary and uncomfortable about this whole proposit ion.
Bart Cammaerts – LSE Media and Communications
While it is a slight coincidence that Cameron gave his long awaited EU-speech in the
heart of  the City (given that he was planning to deliver it in the Netherlands), it is
nevertheless telling. Cameron hinges his bets on an uncertain renegotiation of  Britain’s
membership to the EU, which should, according to Eurosceptics, amount to a signif icantly
dif f erent relationship between the UK and the EU as a whole.
Besides the f act that other member states already indicated that a Europe à la carte is simply
unacceptable (see statements of  Laurent Fabius, Guido Westerwelle  and others), what is missing f rom
Cameron’s speech is a more explicit and clearly articulated rational as to why this re-calibration is needed
in the f irst place, and a ref erence to the type of  policy areas where the UK would like to repatriate
powers f rom Brussels. What exactly are the ‘irritating excrescences of  the European Union’ (according to
Boris Johnson) which the Eurosceptics keep talking about?
If  we brief ly dissect Eurosceptic discourse as to why a Brexit is warranted it becomes apparent that the
‘repatriation of  powers’ f rom Brussels is in f act a code word f or a set of  highly divisive and nasty right
wing policies. The type of  ‘excrescences’ Eurosceptics typically ref er to and want to withdraw f rom are:
harmonized labour laws and minimum social standards protecting employee rights, privacy laws, human
rights legislation relating to civic rights, rights of  migrants, of  asylum seekers or of  other vulnerable
groups in society, health and saf ety regulations, as well as a much more stringent regulatory regime f or
the f inancial and banking sector (which would impact the City of  London). In other words, making the
reasons and areas f or re-negotiation more explicit should make the average Brit ish cit izen very wary and
uncomf ortable indeed about this whole proposition.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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